{"time": "2024-04-17 18:55:00", "attribution": {"en": "Ms. Runa Angus (Senior Director, Strategy and Innovation Policy Sector, Department of Industry)", "fr": "Mme Runa Angus (directrice principale, Secteur des strat\u00e9gies et politiques d'innovation, minist\u00e8re de l'Industrie)"}, "content": {"en": "

Thank you.

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On this, I would say that what the Privacy Commissioner has called for is the Spencer test being put into the law.

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When I look at the paragraph you quoted on that, I see three criteria: the criterion of \u201cexigent circumstances\u201d, the criterion of \u201ca reasonable law\u201d and the criterion of \u201cprescribed circumstances\u201d, which are the three criteria in the Spencer decision. What I want to make clear is that these are three separate criteria, so they are either-or. It can be exigent circumstances, or reasonable law, or prescribed circumstances. Actually, the Spencer decision doesn't refer to them as \u201cprescribed circumstances\u201d but rather as \u201cthe common law authority\u201d that police have, which is in paragraph 71 of R. v. Spencer.

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Those are the three criteria set out in R. v. Spencer. To the extent it should be defined, that is the definition currently used by law enforcement and organizations when they disclose pursuant to PIPEDA.

", "fr": "

Merci.

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\u00c0 ce sujet, je dirais que le commissaire \u00e0 la protection de la vie priv\u00e9e a demand\u00e9 que le crit\u00e8re de l'arr\u00eat Spencer soit int\u00e9gr\u00e9 \u00e0 la loi.

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Lorsque je regarde le paragraphe que vous avez cit\u00e9 \u00e0 ce sujet, je vois trois crit\u00e8res, soit celui des \u00ab circonstances exceptionnelles \u00bb, celui d'une \u00ab mesure l\u00e9gislative raisonnable \u00bb et celui des \u00ab circonstances prescrites \u00bb, qui sont les trois crit\u00e8res de l'arr\u00eat Spencer. Ce que je tiens \u00e0 pr\u00e9ciser, c'est qu'il s'agit de trois crit\u00e8res distincts, de sorte qu'il faut choisir l'un ou l'autre. Il peut s'agir de circonstances exceptionnelles, d'une mesure l\u00e9gislative raisonnable ou de circonstances prescrites. En fait, il n'est pas question, au paragraphe 71 de l'arr\u00eat R. c. Spencer, de \u00ab circonstances prescrites \u00bb, mais plut\u00f4t du \u00ab pouvoir conf\u00e9r\u00e9 par la common law \u00bb aux policiers.

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Ce sont les trois crit\u00e8res \u00e9nonc\u00e9s dans l'affaire R. c. Spencer. Dans la mesure o\u00f9 cette expression doit \u00eatre d\u00e9finie, c'est cette d\u00e9finition qui est actuellement utilis\u00e9e par les organismes d'application de la loi et les organisations lorsqu'ils communiquent des renseignements en vertu de la LPRPDE.

"}, "url": "/committees/industry/44-1/119/runa-angus-1/", "politician_url": null, "politician_membership_url": null, "procedural": false, "source_id": "12686210", "document_url": "/committees/industry/44-1/119/", "related": {"document_speeches_url": "/speeches/?document=%2Fcommittees%2Findustry%2F44-1%2F119%2F"}}