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{
    "time": "2015-02-19 12:05:00",
    "attribution": {
        "en": "Mr. Tamir Israel",
        "fr": "M. Tamir Israel"
    },
    "content": {
        "en": "<p data-HoCid=\"3989872\" data-originallang=\"en\"> The addition of compliance agreements is helpful, but it addresses a very specific scenario. What happens with a privacy complaint is that it goes to the commissioner, she does her report, and she issues a recommendation. It's a non-binding recommendation, so let's say the company agrees to comply. If it changes its mind a year later, you basically have to start from scratch and file another complaint. There is no mechanism to make that enforceable.</p>\n<p data-HoCid=\"3989873\" data-originallang=\"en\">The compliance agreements help a lot in that context, but they don't help with one issue that we're concerned with, which is to put in place incentives for proactive compliance. For that to be in place, you need some type of potential damages to happen if you violate the principles of PIPEDA in a very clear and egregious way. We think that's needed for PIPEDA. Most other privacy and data protection commissioners around the world have those types of powers. We would like to see that in PIPEDA as well.</p>\n<p data-HoCid=\"3989874\" data-originallang=\"en\">Thank you.</p>",
        "fr": "<p data-HoCid=\"3989872\" data-originallang=\"en\"> Les ententes de conformit\u00e9 sont utiles, mais elles s'appliquent \u00e0 un sc\u00e9nario tr\u00e8s pr\u00e9cis. Dans le cas d'une plainte relative \u00e0 la protection des renseignements personnels, la plainte doit \u00eatre pr\u00e9sent\u00e9e au commissaire, qui pr\u00e9parera ensuite un rapport dans lequel sera formul\u00e9e une recommandation. Toutefois, il s'agit d'une recommandation non contraignante. Supposons que l'entreprise accepte de s'y conformer. Si elle change d'avis une ann\u00e9e plus tard, il faudra essentiellement recommencer \u00e0 z\u00e9ro et d\u00e9poser une autre plainte. Il n'y a aucun m\u00e9canisme qui y donne force ex\u00e9cutoire. </p>\n<p data-HoCid=\"3989873\" data-originallang=\"en\">Les ententes de conformit\u00e9 sont tr\u00e8s utiles dans ce contexte, mais elles n'aident pas \u00e0 r\u00e9gler une question qui nous pr\u00e9occupe, \u00e0 savoir l'\u00e9tablissement de mesures qui encouragent une conformit\u00e9 proactive. \u00c0 cette fin, il faut imposer certains types de dommages si quelqu'un ne respecte pas les principes de la LPRPDE de fa\u00e7on tr\u00e8s claire et flagrante. C'est, selon nous, n\u00e9cessaire pour la LPRPDE. D'ailleurs, la plupart des autres commissaires \u00e0 la protection de la vie priv\u00e9e et des renseignements personnels partout dans le monde sont investis de ces pouvoirs. Nous aimerions donc qu'une telle disposition soit ajout\u00e9e \u00e0 la LPRPDE.</p>\n<p data-HoCid=\"3989874\" data-originallang=\"en\">Merci.</p>"
    },
    "url": "/committees/industry/41-2/35/tamir-israel-5/",
    "politician_url": null,
    "politician_membership_url": null,
    "procedural": false,
    "source_id": "8585600",
    "document_url": "/committees/industry/41-2/35/",
    "related": {
        "document_speeches_url": "/speeches/?document=%2Fcommittees%2Findustry%2F41-2%2F35%2F"
    }
}